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Abstract:  
The ECB emerged from the financial crisis as not only as the institutional ‘winner’ but also as 
the most central - and powerful - supranational institution of our times. This article 
challenges the so-called ‘accountable independence’ of the ECB across the range of tasks it 
carries out. Citizens ‘see’ the ECB today especially for its anti-austerity role and its 
involvement as part of the troika and otherwise in the economic decision making of 
troubled Member States. Far from ECB monetary policy heralding a ‘new democratic model’ 
the ECB today suffers from a clear deficit in democracy. In between the grandiose concept 
of ECB ‘independence’ and the more performative ECB ‘accountability’ lies ‘transparency’. 
Across the range of ECB practices there is a need to take the related concepts of 
‘transparency’ and of (democratic) ‘accountability’ more seriously, both in conceptual terms 
and in their relationship to one another.  
I. Introduction 
 
‘Seeing’ the European Central Bank (ECB), a notoriously secretive and defensive institution, 
is not only a matter of newspaper reports, press conferences, formal powers and evolving 
practices, institutional and otherwise. It also crucially depends, for analysis, on the public 
availability of information. On the outside (much) more is known about the ECB and its 
operations than was previously the case. This is due to a combination of leaked information, 
parliamentary enquiries, Ombudsman activity and court cases. There are clear legal limits 
however. The ECB itself is moreover not only passively seen by others but also actively 
expresses voice through its own ‘words’. Those words may be expressed in its annual 
reports, in speeches made by its President or members of its Executive Board (publicly and 
to parliaments), in interviews or speeches by members of its Governing Committee (largely 
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Presidents of national central banks). The discretion it enjoys over what to release, when 
and how is reinforced in the Treaty and in its own internal rules. The ECB enjoys by dint of 
precise Treaty formulation formal ‘public access-free’ status that can only be lifted by 
changing the Treaty.1 The ECB’s internal rules on the classification of documents further 
reinforce zones of secrecy and its autonomy in deciding what to release, to whom and 
when. 
 
An often overlooked additional element in analysing the ECB is what may be termed its 
‘double government’.2 This term refers to the unquestionably important role played by ECB  
economists and lawyers in giving voice both in terms of policy substance and economic 
analysis and in terms of its nature as an independent and (to some extent) autonomous 
institution. The ‘words’ used by the staff economists in particular are well known and often 
referred to by other economists. Less well known but particularly informative are the 
observations made by the Legal Service of the ECB before the CJEU in Luxembourg in a 
series of cases brought either by other institutions or by private citizens (seeking access to 
its documents). These observations are not publicly available however - not even long after 
the case was decided.3 Precisely in the wording used in these observations one can see a 
new actor on the European stage long in denial of its status and the formal application of 
general horizontal rules of the EU. Through on-going scholarship of its (leading) in house 
lawyers and through arguments made behind closed doors in Luxembourg, the case is made 
for an ECB that is not only visibly ‘independent’ (of national political influence) but also 
rather ‘autonomous’ in its exercise of its functions.4 The ECB lost the OLAF battle in 20035 
but not the war. The financial crisis in 2008 and the highly distinctive body of normative 
sources created or developed since then6 gave the ECB new - and incremental - ways of 
claiming autonomy in practice. 
 
The ECB emerged not only as the institutional ‘winner’ in a variety of senses from the 
financial crisis but also as the most central - and powerful - supranational institution of our 
                                                     
1 Article 15 TFEU only applies to ECB and CJEU ‘documents of an administrative nature’ and not more 
generally.  
2 See, Peter Conti-Brown, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve (Princeton University 
Press 2016) 84 et seq. 
3 The ECB eventually provided me with a number of legal observations by the ECB in long-finished cases. 
This raises a more general point of judicial transparency in 2017: why should observations made by (all) 
public institutions and Member States not be immediately publicly available? 
4 See in general, Barbara Dutzler, The European System of Central Banks: An Autonomous Actor? The 
Quest for an Institutional Balance in EMU (Springer 2003). 
5 Case C-11/00 Commission v ECB [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:395. See too an earlier article arguing the ECB’s 
case by (also) the (at that time) Deputy General Counsel at the ECB: Chiara Zillioli and Martin Selmayr, 
‘The European Central Bank: An Independent Specialized Organization of Community Law’, (2000) 37 
CML Rev 591-643. 
6 For a very detailed and helpful analysis see Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Abnormal Sources and Institutional 
Actions in the EU Sovereign Debt Crisis: ECB Crisis Management and the Sovereign Debt Loans’, in L 
Azoulai and M Cremona (eds), EU Legal Acts: Challenges and Transformations (forthcoming, 2017). 
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times.In response to the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB adopted non-standard measures 
reaching beyond the traditional scope of monetary policy.7 The Court of Justice gave its 
blessing to this practice,8 de facto broadening the ECB’s hitherto narrowly defined 
constitutional mandate. In parallel, the ECB has been given new and assumed tasks with 
regard to macro and micro prudential supervision, emergency liquidity assistance and 
negotiating bailout programs. All of this has increased its discretionary power – unmitigated 
by the light-touch legality review as prescribed by the Court9 – amplifying concerns about 
the ECB’s  democratic deficit.  Under President Draghi the ECB has for example kept on 
making use of some of its powers in ways that provide it with leverage beyond the concrete 
reasons why a specific power was originally granted to the ECB. This has clearly been the 
case with emergency liquidity assistance to Greek banks.10  
 
Given the expansion of its powers, it comes as no surprise that the ECB has become a key 
object of study both for legal scholars and for those interested in evolving European politics 
more broadly.11 My aim is to contribute to the existing literature by putting (aspects of) the 
institutional response to the financial crisis of its so-called ‘accountable independence’, first 
coined in this law journal in the early halcyon days of the ECB.12 From today’s perspective 
the idea that ECB monetary policy heralded a ‘new democratic model’ seems unduly 
simplistic, falling into the realm of wishful thinking. What needs more appreciation is the 
fact that in between the grandiose concept of ECB ‘independence’ and the more 
performative ECB ‘accountability’ lies ‘transparency’. My argument is that both 
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ need to be taken more seriously, both separately and in 
relation to one another. As the 2016 report of the Irish parliamentary enquiry into the 
banking crisis shows, it is precisely the lack of transparency coupled with the overly 
defensive attitude of the ECB and its (former) Presidents and Governing Council that very 
largely ‘cause’ the democratic deficit from which it is considered to suffer.13 That is what is 
                                                     
7 For instance the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT program). 
8 See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
9 See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 68 and previous case-law cited therein. See also Case C-62/14 
(opinion of AG Cruz Villalón), Gauweiler [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, para 111. 
10 See further, Fitzpatrick, (n.6). 
11 See, for example, Thomas Beukers, ‘The New ECB and its Relationship with the Eurozone Member 
States: Between Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Intervention’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 1579-
1620; Daniel Wilsher, ‘Ready to do Whatever it Takes? The Legal Mandate of the European Central Bank 
and the Economic Crisis’ (2013) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 503-536; Dermot 
Hodson, ‘De Novo Bodies and the New Intergovernmentalism: The Case of the European Central Bank’ 
in C Bickerton, D Hudson and U Puetter (eds), The New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational 
Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era (OUP 2015) 264-285. See, more generally, Martin Sandbu, Europe’s 
Orphan: The Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt (Princeton University Press, 2015).       
12 Paul Magnette, ‘Towards ‘Accountable Independence’? Parliamentary Controls of the European 
Central Bank and the Rise of a New Democratic Model’ (2000) 6 European Law Journal 326-340, 330. 
13 See the (Irish) Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, Final Report (Vol. 1.,January 2016, , 
356) <https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/02106-HOI-BE-Report-
Volume1.pdf> accessed 13 July 2016. 
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seen from the perspective of national parliamentary democracy – a realm to which the ECB 
considers it owes ‘no accountability’.14 Does ECB transparency as it is interpreted by the ECB 
in 2016 suggest ‘a new paradigm of accountability’15 in the words of its top lawyer? The 
stakes are not small and the issue is hugely salient for the future of the EU in general and 
the Eurozone in particular (even more so with the political vista of further intensification 
and/or differentiation after the Brexit referendum result). 
II. ECB Transparency as Communication  
 
A.  ‘Independent Accountability’ : Mind the Gap 
 
One of the central challenges recognised in the scholarly literature on the ECB from the very 
beginning was the need to strike a balance between independence on the one hand and 
accountability on the other. Unlike other institutional contexts in the EU (e.g. for 
‘independent’ agencies16) this balancing has not traditionally been seen as a catch 22 for the 
ECB.  The literature more generally recognises that accountability and independence are not 
at all contradictory; quite the opposite in the sense that they can and should co-exist.17 As 
Zilioli, now the ECB chief legal advisor, put it pre-crisis, they are ‘complementary 
instruments for democracy.’18  
 
As regards the specific accountability of the ECB vis-à-vis the EP, the Treaty stipulates a 
limited type of accountability in the form of a monetary ‘dialogue’.19 Magnette qualified 
these rules and the emerging empirical practices - already some 16 years ago - as revealing 
what he termed a new kind of democratic model emerging in the EU, namely the model of 
‘accountable independence’.20 This model in his view is based on the influence exerted by 
MEP’s in particular on central bankers rather than through traditional parliamentary 
                                                     
14 Except in the context of the specific provisions of the SSM regulation, Art. 21, see further below. 
15 Chiara Zilioli, ‘The Independence of the European Central Bank and its New Banking Supervisory 
Competences’ in D Ritleng (ed), Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the 
European Union (OUP 2016) 125-179, 132. 
16 Madalina Busuioc, ‘Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies’ (2009) 
15 European Law Journal 599-615; Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012) 140.  
17 Busuioc (n 15) 614. See, more generally, Giandomenico Majone, ‘Independence vs. Accountability? Non-
Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe’ (1994) EUI Working Papers in Political and 
Social Sciences 1994/3. 
18 Chiara Zilioli, ‘Accountability and Independence: Irreconcilable Values or Complementary Instruments for 
Democracy? The Specific Case of the European Central Bank’ in G Vandersanden (ed), Mélanges en hommage 
à Jean-Victor Louis (Editions de l’Universite de Bruxelles 2003) 395–422. 
19 Article 284(3), second subparagraph, TFEU.  
20 Lastra discussed the notion of ‘accountable independence’ even earlier – in her 1992 publication ‘The 
Independence of the European System of Central Banks’ (1992) 33 Harvard lnternational Law Journal 475-519, 
481. 
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constraints. As a spin off, it may include making central bankers more sensitive to 
submitting their decisions to public debates, thus creating potentially more 
responsiveness.21 In terms of evolving political accountability relationships, the interaction 
of the ECB with the EP has grown and intensified over the years.22 Recent empirical work 
has shown some new evidence that it plays a significant role in informing and involving 
members of parliament and their constituencies.23 
 
Be that as it may, monetary dialogue is still a flawed form of ‘accountability’ given the fact 
that ‘parliaments are in an institutionally weak position to hold a central bank 
accountable.’24 Monetary dialogue with the EP moreover very largely ignores the realities of 
the more ‘political’ involvement by the ECB in policies with considerable redistributive 
implications – debt assistance and financial and policy conditionality. Adopting - in 2016 - a 
holistic approach to the ECB as an institution of the EU one must take into account also the 
new (banking supervision) and the concealed (troika input and more) elements. Citizens 
‘see’ the ECB today especially for its anti-austerity role and its involvement as part of the 
troika and otherwise in the economic decision making of troubled Member States. Images 
of burnt out cars and thousands of anti-austerity protestors from all over Europe 
demonstrating in front of the ECB’s glossy new building in Frankfurt25 is after all not the kind 
of political and public attention one normally associates with central banks or with expert 
based institutions more generally. 
 
Transparency is a buzzword of apparently global reach. Some authors even claim ‘the 
transparency turn’ has turned transparency into a ‘global norm’.26 The very word 
transparency connotes visibility and the ability to see through; it implies a subject seeing as 
well as the object being seen. In this sense, it is a two-way street. In the words of Koivisto, ‘a 
                                                     
21 Magnette (n 12) 326.  
22 On the evolving EP-ECB monetary dialogue, see Sylvester Eijffinger and Edin Mujagic, ‘An Assessment of the 
Effectiveness of the Monetary Dialogue on the ECB’s Accountability and Transparency: A Qualitative Approach’ 
(2004) 39 Intereconomics 190-203; Fabian Amtenbrink and Kees van Duin, ‘The European Central Bank Before 
the European Parliament: Theory and Practice after Ten Years of Monetary Dialogue’ (2009) 34 EL Rev 561-
583; Stefan Collignon, Central Bank Accountability in Times of Crisis: The Monetary Dialogue 2009-2014 (note 
prepared at the request of the EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, February 2014); Gregory 
Claeys, Mark Hallerberg and Olga Tschekassin, ‘European Central Bank Accountability: How The Monetary 
Dialogue Could Evolve’ (2014) (4) Bruegel Policy Contribution.  
23 Stefan Collignon and Sebastian Diessner, ‘The ECB’s Monetary Dialogue with the European 
Parliament: Efficiency and Accountability during the Euro Crisis?’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 6, 1296-1312. 
24 Marijn van der Sluis, ‘Maastricht Revisited: Economic Constitutionalism, the ECB and the Bundesbank’, 
in M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary 
Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) 105-123, 115. 
25 See eg Claire Jones, ‘Anti-Capitalist Protesters Target ECB in Frankfurt’ Financial Times (18 March 
2015).  
26 Anne Peters, ‘Towards Transparency as a Global Norm’, in A Peters and A Bianchi (eds), Transparency 
in International Law (CUP 2013) 534-607. 
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beholder and an object form a complex set of affairs.’27 The beholder may force the object 
to react to its ‘gaze’ and in this sense may be controlling. The ECB has struggled since its 
creation with the perceived tension between the need for greater openness or transparency 
on the one hand and the need to preserve its secrets on the other.28 ECB transparency is 
however sandwiched in-between the concept of independence on the one hand and the 
concept of accountability on the other and is under-conceptualised.  
 
Some authors - and policy makers - approach transparency as (only) communication. As 
such they accept that transparency is essentially mediated, and ‘excessively simplified sand 
thus is blind to the complexities of the contemporary state, government information and 
the public.’29 The logic of communication is the core and original understanding of the ECB 
of transparency and reveals almost unlimited discretion as to what is revealed and what is 
kept secret. It is not the beholder controlling the object but rather the opposite.30 Two other 
logics of transparency –of process and of public access are explored below (Parts III and IV) 
–they reveal an ECB less ‘in control’ and forced to assume a more reactive and defensive 
position by virtue of inter-actions with others (parliaments, the public, courts and the 
European Ombudsman). 
 
B. ECB Rationale Transparency as Policy Tool 
 
In a governance context, communication can be equated with the intentional release of 
information on the substance of decisions and of (some of) the facts and reasons on which 
they are based. Such release of information previously intentionally concealed, is (normally) 
to an outside audience, which may be affected by the decision but is not involved in the 
decision-making. It thus makes the outside actor (market, citizen or parliament) aware of 
the existence of what is not known, for example that deliberations, negotiations and votes 
and other elements of constituent decisions have taken place – but does not give 
transparency of the actual process and content of that decision making – at least not in un-
redacted form. Communication can be understood as a form of transparency in rationale31 
although others dispute that it is in fact a form of transparency that can lead to 
accountability with the secret keeper able to retain absolute control over what is released, 
when and how. The very word communication implies linearity of the process and passivity 
on the part of the beholder or recipient. Transparency in rationale enables the secret 
                                                     
27 Ida Koivisto, ‘The Anatomy of Transparency: The Concept and its Multifarious Implications’ (2016) EUI 
Working Paper MWP 2016/09  
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/41166/MWP_2016_09.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 13 
December 2016.  
28 See Fabian Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks. A Comparative Study of the 
European Central Bank (Hart Publishing 1999). 
29 Mark Fenster, ‘Transparency in Search of a Theory’ (2015) 18 European Journal of Social Theory 150-
167. 
30 I am grateful to Agnieszka Smoleńska for this point. 
31 On this qualification of transparency as rationale see Jane Mansbridge, ‘A ‘Selection Model’ of Political 
Representation’ (2009) 17 The Journal of Political Philosophy 369-398. 
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keeper to enjoy almost unlimited discretion to autonomously decide what to intentionally 
reveal and what not to reveal and with what slant to ‘communicate’ it. It may generate 
some legitimacy for the secret keepers, but it is also more vulnerable to manipulation.32  
 
The original understanding of ECB ‘transparency’ in the context of monetary policy was 
transparency in rationale through ‘communication’. This is in line with the worldwide 
tendency for central banks to weave an ‘economy of words’ through the medium of their 
communications.33 Central banks communicate with outside audiences especially the 
market through (press) communiques.34 They  increasingly appreciate what language (‘mere 
words’) can accomplish in the context of public communication imperatives. Press 
conferences, the monthly bulletin, the annual report and the monetary dialogue are all 
mentioned as ECB communication tools.35 From the beginning, the ECB followed a 
deliberate and autonomous strategy to assert its discretion and safeguard its independence 
while at the same time ensuring its version of transparency according to its own rules.36 In 
its own words:  
 
‘Transparency means not only releasing information, but also structuring that information in 
such a way that the public can understand it… . The ECB regards transparency as a crucial 
component of its monetary policy framework. Transparency requires central banks to 
clearly explain how they interpret and implement their mandates. This helps the public to 
monitor and evaluate a central bank’s performance. It also requires an explanation both of 
the analytical frameworks used for its internal decision-making and assessment of the state 
of the economy and of the economic rationale underlying its policy decisions. Transparency 
is strongly enhanced by means of a publicly announced monetary policy strategy.’37 
 
Communication with the markets contributes to the ECB’s objective of ensuring the 
effectiveness, efficiency and credibility of its monetary policy. It now includes ‘forward 
guidance’ for markets and economic actors – a communication instrument by which the ECB 
(and central banks more generally) conveys its monetary policy orientation going forward, 
conditional on its assessment of the economic outlook.38 Communicating with the public 
                                                     
32 See Daniel Naurin, ‘The European Central Bank –Independent and Accountable?’ in S Gustavsson et al 
(eds), The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union (Routledge 2009) 126-140. 
33 Douglas R. Holmes, Economy of Words: Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks (University of 
Chicago Press 2013).  
34 See ibid. 
35 A more complete list of ECB’s communication tools includes: the annual report, the monthly bulletin, press 
releases, statistical information, testimonials before EP and NPs, interviews, public speeches, seminars, 
visitors, the ECB website, conferences, social media, and cultural days. 
36 Nicolas Jabko, ‘Democracy in the Age of the Euro’ (2003) 10 Journal of European Public Policy 710-
739, 731. 
37 ECB, Annual Report (2003), 142. 
38 See further, Peter Praet, ‘Forward Guidance and the ECB’ (4 July 2013) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130806.en.html> accessed 13 July 2016.  
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and with the media helps the ECB in giving full account of its actions. These dual objectives 
of the ECB’s communication policy and the ECB’s commitment to openness and 
transparency in its communication activities are reiterated in all its annual reports (from 
2003 until 2015).  
 
In December 2004, the ECB started making public on a monthly basis Governing Council 
decisions taken in addition to interest rate decisions.39 The information released by the ECB 
does not concern the process (the positions and arguments taken by different members of 
the Governing Council during their discussions) but rather contains the reasoning of the 
collective ECB. This is presented as yet another way in which the ECB exceeds the reporting 
obligations imposed on it by the Treaties (in addition to publishing a Monthly Bulletin 
instead of a quarterly report and holding monthly press conferences even though it is not 
required to do so). The financial crisis triggered several important additional responses by 
the ECB. While it is still heavily focused on controlling its external communication, it 
developed a multi-faceted outreach policy in the post-crisis years. ECB officials (economists 
and lawyers) actively participate in a variety of academic activities including the ECB Forum 
Central Banking40 and a new legal conference.41 Furthermore the ECB undertakes public 
consultations on important new initiatives.42. The ECB further counteracted the backlash 
against the expansion of its mandate by highlighting the need for openness while engaging 
in supervisory work43 and by introducing a revised ECB confidentiality regime.44 The logic of 
transparency in rationale applied to the new supervisory work of the ECB gives the citizen 
the possibility to understand and evaluate the ECB’s supervisory work.45 In 2015, both the 
ECB46 as well as the SSM47 installed a new website, which gathers all publicly available 
information.  
                                                     
39 ECB, Annual Report (2004), 142. 
40 See ECB Forum on Central Banking <https://ecbforum.eu/> accessed 13 July 2016. 
41 See From Monetary Union to Banking Union: on the Way to Capital Markets Union. New Opportunities 
for European Integration(ECB Legal Conference 2015, Frankfurt am Main, 1-2 September 2015).  
42 For example on the Draft Regulation on the exercise of options and discretions granted in the EU framework 
for the prudential supervision of credit institutions - CRR/CRDIV < 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/html/reporting_options.en.html> 
accessed 13 Jul. 2016. 
43 ECB, Annual Report (2015) 94. 
44 Decision of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2014 amending Decision ECB/2004/2 adopting 
the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (OJ L95 of 29.3.2014, p. 56-63).. 
45 See, explicitly, Chairperson Danièle Nouy, who emphasised the goal of transparency in announcing the six 
priorities for 2016, ‘ECB Banking Supervision Publishes Priorities for 2016’   
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/sr160106.en.html> (6 January 2016)  
accessed 13 July 2016.   
46 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html, accessed 13 July 2016. 
47 <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html> accessed 13 July 2016.  
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III. ECB Transparency of Process 
 
A. ECB Rules on Insiders 
 
The concepts of secrecy and of transparency are to be considered in relation to one another 
and as each other’s complement. Secrecy can be defined as the intentional concealment or 
withholding of information48 and is marked by the paradox of being both an element of 
democracy and a threat to it.49 Secrecy creates a form of opacity, which makes it ‘hard to 
discover who takes the decisions, what they are, and who gains and who loses’ – precisely 
the opposite of what transparency means to achieve. Control over openness gives power: it 
influences what others know and thus what they choose to do.50 More generally, secret 
keeping endows secrets with value51 as it gives the person or institution enshrouded by the 
secret ‘an exceptional position’.52 Secrecy is typically ‘deep’ when outsiders have no grasp of 
the type of information that they are being denied, and cannot estimate its size, magnitude 
and content.53 More usual is a shallower form of secrecy. A secret-keeper may share a 
secret (for example, classified information) with limited groups of insiders (depending on 
security clearance for instance). There may or may not be leaks. A secret keeper may also 
share a secret with a restricted group of outsiders (for example a highly restricted group of 
parliamentarians, infra part B. II). Both types of sharing are relevant in the context of the 
ECB and its original and newer tasks. 
 
One reason to traditionally preserve secrecy in the ECB context has been the desire to 
ensure that the independence of the members of the Governing Council is safeguarded from 
direct national pressure.54 ECB secrets however consist not only of the actual (attributed or 
otherwise) minutes of Governing Council meetings, including individual positions and voting 
behavior, but also cover a host of other documents that are classified in one way or another 
by the ECB or by another originator of documents. This logic of secrecy relates to the process 
of decision-making.55 The logic of secrecy in process is linked with ideas of ‘professional 
                                                     
48 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (OUP 1989). 
49 On the more general logics of secrecy see Eva Horn, ‘Logics of Political Secrecy’ (2011) 28 Theory, 
Culture & Society 103-122. 
50 Georg Simmel, ‘The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies ‘ (1906) 11 American Journal of Sociology 
441-498, 482. 
51 Ibid 464. 
52 Ibid 
53 David E. Pozen, ‘Deep Secrecy’ (2010) 62 Stanford Law Review 257-339, 265-275. 
54 National central bank governors in the context of Governing Council decision-making act in their personal 
capacity and make decisions that benefit the euro area as a whole: Article 130 TFEU. See also Point 3.2 of Code 
of Conduct for the Members of the Governing Council (OJ  C 123 of 24.5.2002, p. 9-10), as amended by 
European Central Bank Memorandum of Understanding’ (OJ C 10 of 16.1.2007, p. 6-7)..  
55 See Mansbridge (n 27). 
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secrecy’ and the need for concealment in the interests of efficiency. The rules and practices 
of professional secrecy that have been in the ECB’s internal rules and practices from the very 
beginning and in recent years have expanded to cover new organs and tasks. The 
confidentiality of ECB documents is still governed by Article 23 of ECB rules of procedure, 
which were adopted in 2004.56 This original text was amended in 2014, following the 
conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB. Article 23(1) of the new ECB rules of procedure57 
provides that not only the proceedings of the decision-making bodies of the ECB, or any 
committee or group established by them, but also those of the SSM Supervisory Board, its 
Steering Committee and of any its substructures of a temporary nature must be confidential 
unless the Governing Council authorises the ECB President to make the outcome of their 
deliberations public.58  The recent special report by the European Court of Auditors on the 
SSM specifically notes the considerable difficulty the Court had in obtaining audit evidence 
from the ECB. In their own words, they were provided with “very little of the information we 
required to assess the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB’s comprehensive 
assessments, the operational efficiency of JST’s, the operational efficiency of the planning 
and implementation of supervisory activitiesm the decision-making process and the actual 
work done in the context of on-site inspections.”59 They were not provided with supervisory 
Board decision and minutes, as well as a host of other documents and information.60 
 
The current ECB Confidentiality Regime is publically available only since June 2015.61 Prior to 
that, the ECB Decision on the separation between its monetary and supervisory functions62 
contained an excerpt from the Confidentiality Regime, which details on the ECB’s five 
security classifications. These largely parallel those of the other EU institutions, in particular 
those of the Council63 although there is no ECB-TOP SECRET category, and only two are 
                                                     
56 ECB Decision 2004/2 of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (OJ  
L 080 of 18.3.2004, p. 33-41) as amended by ECB Decision 2009/5 (OJL 3 of 7.1.2009, p. 4-5) and ECB Decision 
2014/1 (OJ L 95 of 29.3.2014, p. 56-63)..  
57 Ibid. 
58 The members of all these bodies are also subject to the professional secrecy requirements under Article 37 
of the ESCB and ECB Statute.  
59 European Court of Auditors,  Single Supervisory Mechanism –Good start but further improvements 
needed”, Special Report, No.29, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016, at p.20. 
60 It appears that the Commission is also denied information in this context despite its duty, according to 
Article 32 of the SSM Regulation to provide comprehensive three yearly review reports on the 
application, appropriateness and effectiveness of the SSM’s governance, accountability and financial 
arrangements. See further, para 92, ECA report, ibid. 
61 See, annex to ECB institutional provisions (June 2015) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecbinstitutionalprovisions2015.en.pdf?a60e27e89660436
9bfa8b5e9266771ca> accessed 13 July 2016. 
62 ECB Decision 2014/39 of 17 September 2014 on the implementation of separation between the monetary 
policy and supervision functions of the European Central Bank (OJ L 300 of 18.10.2014, p. 57-62). 
63 See further, David Galloway, ‘Classifying Secrets in the EU’ (2014) 52 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 668-683.  
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tailored around a (strict) ‘need to know’: ECB-SECRET and ECB-CONFIDENTIAL, which require 
security clearances of staff and stringent storage arrangements.  ‘Restricted’ is defined in the 
Council of the EU’s security rules in very open terms as where the disclosure of a document 
would be ‘disadvantageous’ to the interests of the EU or a Member State. In the ECB 
Business Practice Handbook, this is expressed as ‘a low negative impact on the ECB/ESCB.’ 
Access to information classified as ECB-RESTRICTED or above will be granted only to staff (or 
contractors) having the appropriate security clearances. In November 2015 a Memorandum 
of Understanding on the provision of non-public information was concluded between the 
ECB and the Commission so that the latter could exercise its tasks under Article 32 of the 
SSM Regulation to provide a comprehensive three yearly review report.64 
 
The situation with regard to declassification procedures of the ECB is unclear although 
minimum standards are indicated with respect to ESCB/SSM information in internal 
‘common rules’. Where classification is made at the level of ECB-SECRET or ECB-
CONFIDENTIAL, this classification ‘should be maintained at that level only for as long as the 
information requires such a high level of protection. Whenever possible, the classification 
label should indicate when the document can be downgraded (e.g. on a certain date or at 
the occurrence of a specific event) and what classification would then apply…’.65 The fact 
that there are such explicit rules on a declassification framework is designed to facilitate 
lower classifications or declassification in the future.  
 
Unlike the general EU categories, no public information is available as to the numbers of 
documents held by the ECB in the various categories. However, pursuant to interviews 
conducted at the ECB and access granted to ECB-UNRESTRICTED statistics on the multi-
annual (2008-2014) breakdown of document classifications in DARWIN (the ECB Document 
and Records Management System) it appears that the vast majority of sensitive ECB 
documents and those from other originators is in the category ECB-RESTRICTED (in parallel 
to the known situation with regard to EU-RESTRICTED).66 What is unknown is the number of 
ECB documents that are classified by its officials and the numbers that are classified by 
external ‘originators’ of documents and controlled by them in terms of future release. 
Figures are available for other institutions that show for example that the Council of the EU 
is itself an original classifier in only a small fraction of the documents in the classified 
categories held by it.67 Documents classified by other originators, including internal EU 
institutions and agencies as well as third countries and other international organisations 
(e.g. the IMF) will need to be released by those originators before any declassification can 
take place by the ECB (principle of originator control).  
                                                     
64 See further on the difficulties this has entailed and the delays by the ECB, ECA Report (n. 59, para 92). 
65 ECB Business Practices Handbook (10th version). 
66  In 2014 more than 50% of ECB documents were in the RESTRICTED category. The ECB-CONFIDENTIAL 
category has also grown over the years and now amounts to more than 25% of all ECB documents At the 
same time, there is a steady decline in the number and percentage of unclassified documents: in 2008 
this category amounted to 38% of all ECB documents. By 2014 it had fallen to 1.37%. 
67  See Deirdre Curtin, ‘Overseeing Secrets in the EU: A Democratic Perspective’ (2014) 52 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 684-700, 690. 





B. ECB Rules on (Inside) Outsiders: Accounting Banking Supervision to the EP 
 
It has been widely accepted that the interaction of the EP with the ECB should be a 
qualitatively different one in the area of banking supervision compared to monetary policy. 
The relationships ‘are more intense than those required for monetary policy decisions. 
Weak constraints are unacceptable in the supervisory context because a financial 
supervisor has the power to protect in profound ways the interests of individual financial 
institutions, of financial consumers and even of nation states; the accountability framework 
must be commensurate with the nature and the extent of these powers.’68 That said the 
benefits of transparency are, in the view of the ECB, ‘less clear’ than with regard to 
monetary policy, ‘due to the stigma effect of publicising overt assistance and the nature of 
bank runs (the belief in a panic are self-fulfilling).’69 
 
The result is twofold. First, reporting is due not only to the EP as with monetary policy70 but 
also to national parliaments.71 Second, some sensitive (i.e. classified) information is shared 
with the EP, in particular its ECON committee but this is done in a highly restricted manner. 
At the time the SSM regulation was being adopted a specific ‘inter-institutional agreement’ 
was negotiated between the ECB and the EP containing more specific rules of the 
accountability game.72 Special confidential meetings may be held ‘where necessary for the 
exercise of Parliament’s powers under the TFEU and Union law’, at the request of the Chair 
of the ECON committee – in writing, giving reasons.73 The Chair of the Supervisory Board 
will divulge sensitive information –in ‘confidential oral discussions behind closed doors’ – 
and cooperate with EP investigations. Only the Chair and the Vice-Chairs of the ECON 
committee may attend such confidential meetings with the Chair of the Supervisory 
Board.74 In its 2015 annual report on the banking union,the EP welcomed ‘the efficient and 
                                                     
68 Zilioli (n 15)  125, 159. 
69 Rosa M. Lastra, ‘Accountability and Governance –Banking Union Proposals’ (2012) 30 DSF Policy Paper 
9.  
70 Under Article 20 of the SSM Regulation, the Chair of the Supervisory Board is required to present an 
annual report to the EP in plenary, reply to questions from MEPs and appear before the ECON 
committee upon request. 
71 Ibid, Recital 56, Article 21. 
72 EP-ECB Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central 
Bank on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the 
exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism(OJ L 320 of 30.11.2013, p. 1-6). 
73 Ibid, section I.2, third paragraph. 
74 Ibid, Section I.2, tenth paragraph. 
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open way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards 
Parliament’.75 
 
The inter-institutional agreement states that: ‘No minutes or any other recording of the 
confidential meetings shall be taken. No statement shall be made for the press or any other 
media. Each participant to the confidential discussions shall sign every time a solemn 
declaration not to divulge the content of those discussions to any third person.’ How can 
such restricted ‘dialogue’ still influence policy, one of the aims of the new reporting 
relationship? Strict confidentiality requirements make it difficult to assess the de facto 
accountability arrangements at the time of writing. Even though the Inter-Institutional 
Agreement provides room for more ‘intense’ accountability to the European Parliament 
compared to the pre-existing monetary dialogue, the extensive emphasis on secrecy and 
confidentiality with regard to all the information supplied by the ECB to the EP does not 
leave much room for public discussion or debate on this information in plenary or even in 
the ECON committee. This in turn removes the raw ingredients for accountability - 
information and deliberation - from public space, even after the fact. This equally seems to 
be the case for other accountability forums such as the Court of Auditors who are denied 
access to documentation on the ad-hoc exchange of views between the European 
Parliament and the Chair of the Supervisory Board. 76 
 
The new ECB special arrangements are in line with existing practice in other areas where the 
EP has already been granted some access to classified information produced and circulated 
under the auspices of the EU (unless subject to the principle of originator control) on the 
Councils premises77 and more recently on EP premises. The question whether this restrictive 
approach is justified in general and in the wider context of parliaments agreeing to non-
public accountability processes is beyond the scope of this article.78 A parliamentary 
confidential information provision may well provide only the appearance – rather than the 
reality – of a parliamentary check on matters of substance.79 The EP is a collective body and 
there is nothing that a highly restricted group can do to stop or prevent any of the secret 
policies it is informed about from being executed. Limiting access in an extreme fashion 
creates different classes of legislators in a manner that is not necessarily limited in the 
public interest. The re-calibration of transparency and accountability mechanisms in the 
                                                     
75 EP, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘ Report on the Banking Union- Annual Report 
2015’, 19 february 2016, para. 39. 
76 See further, ECA Report (n.58, para 19).  
 
77 Guri Rosén, ‘Can You Keep a Secret? How the European Parliament Got Access to Sensitive Documents in the 
Area of Security and Defence’ (2011) 22 RECON Working Paper.  
78 See further Deirdre Curtin, ‘Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy’ (2014) 77 MLR 
1-32. 
79 Kathleen Clark, ‘Congressional Access to Intelligence Information: The Appearance of a Check on 
Executive Power’ (2012) Washington University Legal Studies Research Paper (12 July 2002). 
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context of banking supervision (and of banking resolution) is at best partial and leaves much 
to be desired in the view of the EP80 and of academic commentators.81  
IV.  ECB Transparency Through Public Access 
 
A. The ECB: A Public Access Free Zone? 
 
The final logic of transparency (after rationale and process) is that of openness or of public 
access. This logic does not patronise the citizen but rather values the role that the public 
and the informed citizen can play in a wider democratic perspective. In this perspective 
transparency is seen as a fundamental citizen’s right and as a means of securing public 
accountability. It implies that all arms of government – the executive, the entire public 
administration as well as parliaments – should be subject to the requirement of openness or 
public access.82 The deeper democratic meaning of why openness and transparency are 
important is on this logic that ‘increased openness (…) enables citizens to participate more 
closely in the decision-making process and guarantees (…) greater legitimacy and is more 
effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system.’83  
 
Under the fourth subparagraph of Article 15(3) TFEU, the Union’s access to documents 
regime applies to the ECB only when it exercises its administrative tasks. However, the ECB 
has provided some public access to its documents since the beginning of its existence.84 The 
first ECB decision on the subject was adopted on 3 November 1998.85 It was repealed in 
2004 when a new decision was introduced.86 This was three years after the general 
regulation on access to documents entered into force.87 The 2004 Decision follows the 
                                                     
80 It appears that the EP is still not satisfied with the status quo that has been reached with regard to the 
SSM, see its report on the Banking Union: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0093+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
81 See eg Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg, ‘Supervisory Transparency in the European Banking 
Union’ (2014) Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/1 < http://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/imported/publications/pc_2014_01_.pdf> accessed 13 December 2016..  
82 Carsten Grønbech-Jensen, ‘The Scandinavian Tradition of Open Government and the European Union: 
Problems of Compatibility?’ (1998) 5 Journal of European Public Policy 185-199, 187.  
83 Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Turco v Council of Ministers [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, para 45, 
reiterating the preamble of Regulation 1049/2001.  
84 B.ernd Krauskopf and Christine Steven ‘The Institutional Framework of the European System of 
Central Banks: Legal Issues in the Practice of the First Ten Years of its Existence’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 
1143-1175, 1148.  
85 ECB Decision of 3 November 1998 concerning public access to documentation and the archives of the 
ECB (OJ L 110 of 28.4.1999, p. 30-32). 
86 ECB Decision 2004/3 of 4 March 2004 on public access to ECB documents (OJ L 80 of 18.3.2004, p. 42-
44), as amended by ECB Decision 2011/6 (OJ L 158 of 16.6.2011, p. 37-38). 
87 Regulation 1049/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145 of 31.5.2001, p. 43-48).  
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structure of the general EU law on access to documents88 while seeking to protect the 
independence of the ECB and of the national central banks and the confidentiality of certain 
information that is specific to the performance of ESCB’s tasks.89 In applying the exceptions 
to the right of access provided for in Article 4 of the 2004 Decision, the ECB did not limit that 
right solely to documents falling within the exercise of its administrative tasks, as referred to 
in the fourth subparagraph of Article 15(3) TFEU. The ECB has however long resisted what it 
terms ‘demand-driven’ transparency – where the public rather than the ECB controls what 
information it has access to.90 Public access to ‘raw data’ from the policy process is avoided 
as we have seen above in favor of the ECB explaining the rationale of policies and 
processes.91 
 
In 2011 the 2004 ECB Decision was amended ‘in order to take into account the new ESRB-
related activities of the ECB’.92 This amendment reflects the fact that the ECB draws up and 
holds documents ‘in the field of financial stability, including documents relating to its 
support to the ESRB, which qualify as ECB documents within the meaning of Decision 
ECB/2004/3. It provides that the ECB may refuse public access to ECB documents where 
their disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards the 
stability of the financial system in the EU.’93 In a recent court application,94 the applicant 
claims that the 2011 amending decision ‘materially extended the scope of refusal grounds’ 
set out in Article 4(1)(a) of the 2004 Decision. This claim was rejected by the Court. 
 
With regard to its (new) supervisory functions, the ECB is subject to the general EU law on 
access to documents. This difference is probably due to the more direct effect of a 
supervisory decision on the Banks supervised than is the case with regard to monetary 
policy. Recital 59 of the SSM Regulation states that ‘[t]he regulation referred to in Article 
15(3) TFEU [which is currently Regulation 1049/2001] should determine detailed rules 
enabling access to documents held by the ECB resulting from the carrying out of supervisory 
tasks, in accordance with the TFEU’. A revision procedure of the general EU law on access to 
documents is underway – without any success – for the past eight years. The current draft 
revision law is based on a 2008 (and later 2011) proposal by the Commission, and therefore, 
                                                     
88 Ibid. 
89 Krauskopf and Steven (n 84), 1148. 
90 Otmar Issing, ‘The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or Willem in Euroland’, (1999) 37 
Journal of Common Market Studies 503-519. 
91 See further, Naurin (n 32) 133.  
92 ECB, Annual Report (2012) 165. 
93 The Legal Framework of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (version July 
2014)<http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/legalframeworkeurosystemescb2014en.pdf> 73, 
accessed 13 July 2016. 
94 Case T-376/13 Versorgungswerk der Zahnärztekammer Schleswig-Holstein v ECB [2015]  
ECLI:EU:T:2015:361. 
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does not take into account the changes brought about by the 2013 SSM Regulation.95 The 
ECB decision on access to documents was in the meantime formally amended in January 21, 
2015, in order to take into account the new supervisory activities of the ECB.96  
 
Rather extraordinarily, the Annual Report of the ECB does not contain any details regarding 
its access to documents regime and – unlike other EU institutions – the ECB does not 
produce an annual access to documents report with detailed information on who, why, 
when information is refused or provided. The position of the ECB is steadfastly that it is not 
subject to the requirements of the Treaty or of the Regulation in this regard and that its 
provisions in this regard are purely voluntary and specific. This is a missed opportunity. At 
the very least, the ECB should start publishing Annual Reports on the details and application 
of its own public access rules in a similar manner to other EU institutions. It is hard to avoid 
the overall conclusion that the ECB is neither pro-active nor transparent in applying its own 
public access regime. The failure to publicly document the application of its policies (even if 
partially ‘voluntarily’ assumed) seems to indicate a failure to take the public dimension very 
seriously despite the changes in the role and tasks of the ECB in recent years. 
 
B. The ECB: A National Parliament Free Zone? 
 
Despite the limited number of cases regarding the ECB’s legal framework, the question 
whether the limited public access policy of the ECB should nonetheless be further 
broadened voluntarily was raised in a public fashion by a number of ‘incidents’. One major 
incident raised the issue of ECB secrecy at the expense of national parliaments, citizens and 
public debate and is in many ways paradigmatic.   
 
For the previous President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, letters were a frequent and 
distinctive form of ECB communication.97 On November 19, 2010, Ireland’s Minister for 
Finance received a letter from Trichet. This letter was strongly worded and indicated to him 
                                                     
95 Legislative Resolution of the European Parliament of 15 December 2011 on the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents (recast) (COM(2008)0229 – C6-0184/2008 – 
2008/0090(COD)) (OJ C 168E of 17.6.2013, p. 45-54).  
96 ECB Decision 2015/529/EU of 21 January 2015 amending ECB Decision 2004/3 on public access to ECB 
documents (ECB/2015/1) (OJ L 84 of 28.3.2015, p. 64-66). 
97 Besides the most prominent Irish example, Trichet also revealed that he sent two other secret letters 
to the prime ministers of Italy and Spain on 5 August 2011, see e.g. Jean-Claude Trichet, ‘Letters to Two 
Prime Ministers’ Nikkei Asian Review (25 September 2014). These letters were sent immediately after 
the ECB started to buy Italian and Spanish bonds. Trichet implied that the support will not be continued 
unless Italy and Spain introduce indicated economic, fiscal and structural measures.   Two days later he 
sent a letter to Greece, warning that Gree banks may be excluded from Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
from the Eurosystem if Greece persisted on its debt rescheduling. See Yannis Palaiologos, ‘How Trichet 
Threatened to Cut Greece Off’ ekatherimini.com (11 March 2014). Under Trichet’s successor, ECB 
President Draghi, the ECB also used its powers with regard to ELA beyond the reasons for which they 
were granted to get leverage in the negotiations between Greece and Eurozone in 2015. See Valentina 
Pop, ‘ECB ratchets up pressure on Greece’, EU Observer (5 February 2015) 
<https://euobserver.com/political/127501> accessed 13 December 2016. 
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in forthright terms that Ireland should enter a bailout program.98 Irish Minister Lehihan was 
adamant at that time that ‘the major force of pressure for a bailout came from the ECB’.99 In 
November 2011 when the dust had long settled and Ireland had entered the ‘Economic 
Adjustment Programme’, an Irish journalist sought public access to the secret Trichet letter 
under the EU public access regulation.100 
 
Both the Irish Ministry and the ECB refused to make the letters accessible. According to 
customary rules on secrecy the ECB as originator must give permission before the addressee 
can release it.  The ECB claimed professional secrecy and the Governing Council of the ECB 
refused to grant any type of access to the letter in question.101 The case was first brought 
before the European Ombudsman in October 2012. She held that the refusal of the ECB was 
legal due to the invocation of a ‘public interest’, in particular the integrity and stability of 
the monetary and financial system. Nevertheless, she emphasised the ECB’s commitment 
towards transparency and tried to encourage the ECB to voluntarily publish the relevant 
letters- given the time that had expired in the meantime and the fact that Ireland had since 
exited the bailout program.102 The ECB rejected this proposal and emphasised the on-going 
need for non-disclosure due to the still-critical state of the Irish financial system and post-
programme surveillance.  
 
On 7 May 2014, an Irish Parliamentary Joint Committee of Inquiry was established into 
certain aspects of Irelands Banking Crisis.103 One issue that came up very quickly in this 
parliamentary inquiry was the ECB letter. The view was taken that the Trichet letter would 
inevitably shed considerable light on the sequence of events in a matter that is of the 
greatest possible public importance in Ireland even five years later. Committees of inquiry 
just as parliaments are able to take measures to ensure the non-public debate of documents 
that are classified or where there is an imperative necessity to keep them secret. Even still, 
ex-President Trichet refused to appear before the Irish Banking Inquiry to answer questions 
                                                     
98 The public letter from Trichet to Lenihan is available at 
<http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/shared/pdf/2010-11-
19_Letter_ECB_President_to%20IE_FinMin.pdf?31295060a74c0ffe738a12cd9139f578> accessed 13 July 
2016. 
99 See, Karl Whelan, ‘The ECB’s Secret Letter to Ireland: Some Questions’ Forbes (17 August 2012). 
100 Various people had already been unsuccessful in Ireland in obtaining access to the letter under the Irish 
Freedom of Information Act, which was refused by the Irish Ministry of Finance, see 
<http://www.thejournal.ie/department-of-finance-foi-ecb-letters-573104-Aug2012/> accessed 13 July 2016.  
101 See Gavin Sheridan and Tom Lyons, ‘ECB Refuses to Release 'Threat' Letter’ Independent.ie (12 
February 2012). 
102 Decision of the European Ombudsman closing the inquiry into complaint 1703/2012/(VIK)CK against 
the European Central Bank (ECB) 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/54178/html.bookmark> accessed 13 
July 2016 and <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/53710/html.bookmark> 
accessed 13 July 2016. 
103 Joint Committee of Inquiry of the Banking Crisis <https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/> accessed 
13 July 2016. 
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about what happened and the precise role of the ECB. He claimed professional privilege 
three years after he left the Bank.104 Internal rules and the discretion of the ECB Governing 
Council meant that parliaments could not exercise their accountability function even after 
Ireland has re-emerged from the crisis. Ex-President Trichet was categorical in stating: ‘I 
won’t appear, it’s not my responsibility’.105 Only after a leak of the documents in the Irish 
media in the morning of November 6, 2014, did the ECB decide to publish the letters on the 
same day. This illustrates how disobedience and leaking can be a trigger for institutions to 
re-consider entrenched positions and the on-going necessity over time to keep secrets.106 
 
The Irish letter reveals a troubling account of the relationship between ECB and Ireland 
during the bailout in 2010 and contained an implicit threat that support for Ireland’s banks 
was at risk.107 According to the findings of the Irish parliamentary inquiry, the ECB actually 
‘contributed to the inappropriate placing of significant banking debts on the Irish citizen.’108 
Moreover, the ECB had ‘direct involvement in terms of significant decisions taken by the 
Irish Government… in the period under investigation.’109 Despite such far-reaching 
conclusions, the precise modalities of ECB participation in the troika and the information it 
gathers and feeds into the overall decision-making process in the context of debt assistance 
remains (largely) unknown110 and seems to exist outside of democratic accountability 
processes at any level of governance. In this regard the ECB is clearly more in control than 
under effective control. This has not gone unnoticed, also more structurally. The Court of 
Auditors in a recent report insists that formal arrangements be put in place in the case of 
financial assistance programmes.111 
                                                     
104 Letter from ECB president Mario Draghi to Ciaran Lynch, chairman of the Joint Committee of Inquiry 
into the Banking Crisis (15 December 2014)  <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/ecb-letter-full-
text-of-correspondence-from-mario-draghi-to-ciarán-lynch-1.2040152> accessed 13 July 2016.  
105 Michelle Hennessy, ‘Trichet: I Won’t Appear Before Banking Inquiry – It’s Not My Responsibility’ 
Business ETC - Economy, Technology and Companies (7 May 2014).  He subsequently gave a speech in 
Dublin, in april 2015, attended by members of the inquiry and in that public context did answer some 
questions. See ‘30/4/2015: Jean Claude Trichet – Former President of the ECB’ 
<https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/hearings/jean-claude-trichet-iiea-event-not-an-official-inquiry-
hearing/> accessed 13 July 2016. 
106 See in general Pozen (n 53).  
107 See Gavin Sheridan and Fred Logue, ‘Right of Access to Public Data a Crucial Tool in Democracy’ Irish 
Examiner (7 November 2014). 
108 Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis (n 13) 373 (author’s italics). 
109 Ibid 356 (author’s italics). 
110 However, see ECB Response to EP Questionnaire on the Troika< 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140110_ecb_response_troika_questionnaireen.pdf> 
accessed 13 July 2016.  
111 See European Court of Auditors, Special Report no. 18/2015: Financial Assistance Provided to 
Countries in Difficulties (26 January 2016) 
<http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=35016> accessed 13 July 2016.  
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V.  ECB In Control Or Under Control? 
 
The influence of novel functional and institutional developments in recent years on the 
traditional understanding of ECB independence and its accountability remains largely 
unexplored and limited to a rather formal account of both.112 Yet as some prominent 
legal113 and political science114 scholars have stressed, the almost hidden nature of the ECB’s 
evolving and ‘autonomous’ de facto powers is highly problematic from a more general 
viewpoint. The rhetoric of the ECB is pronounced when it comes to how its own 
transparency policy is a constituent element of its accountability. Yet the manner in which it 
reflects about its transparency is largely acclamatory and it views transparency as 
communication as largely synonymous with its own actual policy tools. Its self-
understanding is strong and finds a visual counterpart in the language of the architecture of 
the ECB’s new building in Frankfurt. The architectural construction of a glass atrium 
connecting twin towers can be considered a metaphor for the new ECB, at least in terms of 
its own ambition and self-presentation.115 The reality certainly does not enable the beholder 
to see straight through and there are significant shutters and blinds in place. Following 
Bovens transparency is a necessary but insufficient condition of accountability.116 Citizen 
accountability through transparency is often an illusion.117 On the other hand the media and 
other stakeholders can and do use transparency to force change in reality. Transparency 
also enables the media to work as fire-alarms triggering vertical (parliamentary) 
accountability.118 
 
The ECB is not unlike central banks in many advanced economies where they have become 
very powerful and have acquired a host of highly political powers. The difference is that 
there is no economic counterpart at the supranational level unlike at the national political 
level (in Europe at any rate). The ECB certainly does not live in fear of what the EP (not to 
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mind national parliaments) can do to it. There is also a growing inter-institutional dimension 
among old and new actors with many novel aspects needing further research and 
elaboration. For example, does the sharing of information about financial institutions and 
banks between a variety of actors, including the ECB, create a closed system of inter-
institutional accountability between ‘expert’ institutions charged with different mandates? 
How does this sharing of information fit within a more public and political system of 
accountability in the EU legal and political order? We may well already be facing a less linear 
and more fragmented financial governance system within the EU with a host of new 
questions thrown up on the relationship between transparency, the limits of the need for 
confidentiality and outside accountability mechanisms. In the absence of Treaty level 
amendment, the ECB can make a start by proactively, cutting down its own vast discretion 
in ways that are less reactive and defensive than what it has done to-date. It will, after all, 
not be returning to its knitting anytime soon.119 
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